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Abstract: Previous literature has shown contradictory results regarding the 
relationship between economic liberalism at the country level and firms’ 
engagement in corporate social action. Because liberalism is associated with 
individualism, it is often assumed that firms will engage in mostly symbolic rather 
than substantive social and environmental actions; in other words, they will 
practice ‘greenwashing’. To understand how cultural beliefs in the virtues of 
liberalism affect the likelihood of greenwashing, we disentangle the effects of the 
distinct and co-existing beliefs in the virtues of economic liberalism. We begin by 
conducting an exploratory qualitative analysis of managers’ sentiments on this 
matter, based on a focus group methodology. We then use these investigative 
elements to articulate a comparison of the conflicting theoretical arguments: in 
liberal contexts, are firms, as social entities, inherently selfish or pro-active when 
it comes to corporate social actions? We empirically test our hypotheses on a 
large-scale dataset. Finally, we show paradoxically that in countries where beliefs 
in the virtues of competition are strong, firms are more likely to greenwash, while 
in countries where beliefs in the virtues of individual responsibility are prominent, 
firms are more likely to focus on concrete actions. These findings suggest that in 
contexts where weak governments are seen as ideal, firms might feel the need to 
step in to fill institutional voids, in contexts in which competitive mindsets 
dominate, this tendency is counterbalanced. 
 
 
Keywords: corporate social actions, greenwashing, economic liberalism, 
competition, individual responsibility, country-level institutions.  
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Introduction 
The responsibility of firms towards their stakeholders and the concrete 
actions this responsibility requires have become a central managerial concern. 
We nevertheless observe an ambiguity in the nature of firms’ socially 
‘responsible’ activities and the way they are designed. Corporate social actions 
(CSA) are designed to ensure the stakeholders’ welfare (Marquis, Glynn and 
Davis, 2007) and include a broad range of activities implied by the firm’s 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). But the true motivations behind CSA have 
remained a constant topic of inquiry (Buehler and Shetty, 1974). Firms may 
design these actions to mislead their stakeholders about the magnitude of their 
engagement in order to gain legitimacy (Walker and Wan, 2012). In this respect, 
they are commonly said to engage in what has been termed ‘greenwashing’ 
(Delmas and Burbano, 2011). Greenwashing is defined as giving priority to CSA 
symbolically rather than substantively (Walker and Wan, 2012). They opt for 
actions aimed at anchoring the firms’ conformity to social responsibility (e.g. 
green accreditations, CEO speeches, sustainability reporting) in the 
stakeholders’ mind to the detriment of what is effectively impacting the 
stakeholders’ welfare (e.g. reduction in CO! emissions, implementation of safety 
guidelines at work) (Walker & Wan, 2012). In other words, the balance of their 
actions favors a stated and ostensible commitment to benefit stakeholders rather 
than a genuine dedication to effectively increase the stakeholders’ welfare (Lim & 
Tsutsui, 2012)..  
Business scholars have progressively tried to come up with an 
instrumental justification for CSA (Lee, 2008). Several try to understand the 
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consequences of substantive CSA in terms of the firms’ financial performance 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Walker & Wan, 2012). 
Others suggest that firms could design and frame their social activities 
symbolically and still maximize their profits (Weaver, Trevino & Cochran, 1999; 
Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Hawn & Ioannou, 2012). Quite a number of studies 
also attempt to identify genuine motives which lead to CSA (Hemingway & 
Maclagan, 2004). In particular, the literature has largely pointed out the role of 
cultural beliefs at the country level in pushing firms toward more or less CSA. 
Populations share cultural beliefs and values that may foster or dampen firms’ 
implementation of CSA. Matten and Moon (2008) argue, for instance, that the 
nature of economic systems and rationales at the national level influence the 
features of CSA, whether they are ‘implicit’ (abiding by social norms) or ‘explicit’ 
(voluntary programs). The role played by institutional diversity in the approach to 
CSA is a fruitful area of research (Brammer, Jackson, and Matten, 2012). 
While the impact of liberalism on CSA has often been looked at (see 
Campbell, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2008; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012; Kinderman, 2012), Jackson and Deeg (2008: 541) have 
stressed that institutions should not be analyzed ‘as unidimensional variables’ or 
operationalized with ‘summary indicators’. At the country level, economic 
systems are based on a complex combination of shared beliefs regarding 
economic rationality (Denzau & North, 1994). The beliefs in the virtues of 
liberalism form one example of these cultural attitudes, which may or may not be 
shared by populations at the country level. We suggest that two distinct cultural 
beliefs prevail: the populations’ belief in the central role of individual responsibility 
rather than that of governments, and the belief in the advantages of competition 
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(Hay, 2004; Whitman, 1999; Fligstein, 2001). Populations which believe in the 
virtues of liberalism in turn believe in the virtue of individual responsibility and 
competition rather than governmental responsibility and regulation. Lim and 
Tsutsui (2012) argue that more liberal economic systems, more competitive and 
individualist societies proportionally increase the likelihood of firms’ implementing 
CSA, although these actions remain symbolic rather than substantive in 
developed countries. These scholars underline how liberal systems lead firms to 
anticipate criticism and build their legitimacy with impression management tactics 
such as symbolic CSA (Prechel & Morris, 2010; Jones and Nisbet, 2011). This 
argument relies on the idea that firms take advantage of the freedom offered by 
less institutionalized environments (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). However, 
Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) put forward a different argument, suggesting 
that in liberal economies where the role of government is limited and competition 
is fierce, a vacuum emerges from the lack of regulation, and firms therefore tend 
to engage in more substantive social behaviors to answer stakeholders’ needs 
that are not met by the state. The extent to which greenwashing occurs reflects 
the balance between symbolic and substantive CSA (Walker and Wan, 2012): 
firms that are willing to engage in CSA for the legitimacy benefits it generates will 
tend to favor symbolic rather than substantive actions. Thus, it is unclear whether 
beliefs in the virtue of liberalism itself favor or hamper the likelihood to engage in 
greenwashing. 
These two rationales implying that liberalism has a bearing on the 
propensity to greenwash differ in their propositions, because they make antithetic 
assumptions regarding firms’ reactions to the individualistic and competitive 
nature of their environment. Conventional wisdom holds that populations’ cultural 
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belief in the virtues of liberalism leads to more greenwashing. In this sense it 
implies that firms, as social entities, are inherently selfish. When embedded in a 
liberal context, they favor impression management tactics and symbolic CSA 
which make stakeholders believe a firm is responsible, when it is not, with limited 
costs. On the contrary, the proponents of voluntarism consider that beliefs in 
liberalism lead to more effective actions in terms of social impact on stakeholders 
rather than in terms of benefits for the firm. In that sense it makes the unspoken 
assumption that firms are pro-active: When favoring liberal values, firms step into 
the space left by a weak government by providing stakeholders with beneficial 
CSA.  
In this study, we specifically focus on the impact of two beliefs on how 
CSA is approached, which play a fundamental role in designing liberal economic 
systems: the belief in the beneficial role of competition, and the belief in the 
preeminence of individual responsibility (Hay, 2004). We first set up the 
conceptual building blocks of our study, by defining the key concepts and our 
theoretical lens. We then begin investigating how those concepts articulate 
through an exploratory qualitative study. We use a focus group method, 
commonly used in anthropology (Agar and MacDonald, 1995) and in medical 
research (Kitzinger, 1995), but also in business ethics (Vyakarnam, Bailey, Myers 
and Burnett, 1997; Freestone and Mitchell, 2004). We complement this with 
interview data. Building on these findings, we put forward two alternative sets of 
hypotheses. Following the traditional view we expect beliefs in favor of 
competition and individual responsibility both to induce greenwashing, but we 
also formulate the opposite hypothesis, that beliefs in favor of competition and 
individual responsibility will be negatively related to greenwashing.  
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To date, even if some scholars investigated the impact of liberal 
economies on the nature of CSA (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Lim & Tsutsui, 
2012) or the determinants of greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano, 2011), no 
study has looked at how fundamental shared beliefs that underpin liberalism can 
be a potential determinant of greenwashing. By disentangling the differential 
effects of our two foundational beliefs, we aim at understanding how seemingly 
similar values can have contrasting effects on corporate action. We construct our 
measures of country-level beliefs in the role of competition and individualism 
from the World Value Survey, assess the nature of CSA at the firm level using 
Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 database, and then test our hypotheses on a sample 
of 2,621 firms spanning from 2002 to 2008. Our results show that the two 
foundational beliefs we study have opposite effects.  
In this sense, our findings confirm Bowie’s challenge of the ‘egoistic 
paradigm’ (Bowie, 1991). They show that even under the assumption of 
economic rationality, when populations believe in the virtues of liberalism, they 
do not necessarily screen out actions going beyond shareholder value 
maximization (Stormer, 2003). When beliefs in the virtues of competition are 
strong, firms are more likely to greenwash, while in individualistic societies firms 
tend to be less favorable to greenwashing. 
 
Introducing the Concepts: Greenwashing, Economic Liberalism and 
Shared Beliefs  
 The role of business in society has been of central interest for 
management scholars, since social and environmental concerns have been more 
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and more pressing (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) refers to the responsibility of firms towards society. Corporate social 
actions (CSA) refer to the actual undertakings this responsibility implies (Marquis, 
Glynn and Davis, 2007). CSAs are defined as initiatives that aim at benefiting the 
welfare of a firm’s stakeholders (Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007). This distinction 
is made necessary by situations in which firms might engage in CSAs without 
being socially responsible (Buehler and Shetty, 1974), just because it generates 
positive spillover effects. However, the institutional determinants of corporate 
social behaviors remain to be explored (Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012). 
Depending on the country, CSA can be seen as more or less legitimate 
(Lim & Tsutsui, 2012; Julian & Ofori-Dankwa 2013). Firms tend to implement 
actions which provide them with legitimacy gains (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Therefore, depending on the firms’ country of origin, CSA is implemented in 
different ways. This article falls within the scope of studies looking at how a 
cultural context may affect socially responsible behaviors (Campbell, 2007), and 
tries to explain how and why the nature of CSA may vary across countries 
(Maignan & Raston, 2002). More specifically, we focus on how country-wide 
beliefs in the virtues of liberalism may lead to greenwashing, or in other terms, 
‘talking about’, rather than actually engaging with CSA (Delmas and Burbano, 
2011; Walker and Wan, 2012).  
What is ‘Greenwashing’? 
Firms are sometimes prone to comply only in appearance with 
stakeholders’ needs (Westphal and Zajac, 2001) when they try to build or repair 
reputation or gain legitimacy (Prechel and Morris, 2010). With the growing 
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concerns regarding their responsibility towards society, firms have learnt how to 
design their CSA strategically rather than implement it substantively (Walker and 
Wan, 2012). Mainstream media and management research have discussed 
those strategies using the umbrella term ‘greenwashing’ (Laufer, 2003; Ramus 
and Montiel, 2005; Delmas and Burbano, 2011). 
A common way to define greenwashing is to refer to the nature of the 
firm’s CSA:  Walker and Wan (2012) define greenwashing as the gap between 
‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ CSA. Management scholars have for a long time 
contrasted different forms of CSA: to respond to institutional pressure, firms may 
substantively conform to imposed norms, or pretend to do so (i.e. ostensible 
conformity) (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). More specifically, 
when we talk about CSA, symbolic CSA includes what the company claims to 
plan to do in terms of socially responsible behaviors, while substantive CSA is 
what the company is actually doing or has done in terms of CSA (Walker & Wan, 
2012). Thus, greenwashing is a decoupling strategy that aims at gaining 
legitimacy and signaling conformity rather than actually conforming (Delmas and 
Burbano, 2011). This usually takes the form of favoring symbolic actions (Weaver 
et al., 1999) such as policy claims and codes of conduct (Christmann & Taylor, 
2006), social accreditations or green labels (Walker & Wan, 2012). Russo and 
Harrison (2005) take the example of the ISO 14001 certification and prove, 
paradoxically, that it is related to more environmental wrongdoing. Firms can take 
actions detrimental to the environment but still be certified (King, Lenox, & 
Terlaak, 2005), they can implement substantive measures to protect their 
employees but stay silent about them. Equally, they can simultaneously engage 
in both substantive and symbolic actions (Hawn & Ioannou, 2012).  
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Greenwashing has been proven to be strategic in the sense that it may 
mislead stakeholders about a firm’s actual social performance. This strategy may 
trigger stakeholder support, but with minimal investment in substantive (and 
necessarily more costly) CSA (Husted & Allen, 2009).  However, greenwashing is 
not necessarily ‘bought’ by stakeholders and when this is the case, it may also 
destroy value (Walker & Wan, 2012). We propose, therefore, that what matters 
when it comes to engaging in greenwashing are the beliefs and values anchored 
in the firm’s direct environment. More specifically, we suggest that it is beliefs in 
the virtues of liberalism which drive the various approaches to CSA. Jackson and 
Deeg (2008) have explained the benefits of looking at precise sub-elements of 
the institutional context for international business research, where institutions are 
often approached as monolithic determinants of corporate behaviors. In this 
study, we offer a more fine-grained understanding of the effect of economic 
liberalism on corporate behaviors. 
Economic Liberalism and Shared Beliefs 
Research has pointed out the role of country-level cultural values in the 
construction of corporate behaviors (Matten & Moon, 2008). Rather than simply 
trying to act in their own interest, individuals share beliefs that model their 
behaviors (Denzau & North, 1994). Cultural beliefs are norms and values that are 
shared at the country level and may influence both stakeholders and 
organizational decision-making. Denzau and North (1994) explain that social 
agents sharing ‘common cultural background’ make sense of their environment in 
the same way and have a similar set of reactions at their disposal. Beliefs sustain 
the rationale of social agents, which in turn enable and constrain their social and 
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economic behaviors (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).   
Country-level institutional contexts therefore act as both a constraint and 
enabler for corporate behaviors, and, more specifically, for CSA. Norms 
regarding appropriate corporate behaviors – which evolve at a macro level - act 
as mediators between economic constraints and engagement in CSA (Campbell, 
2007). What firms consider acceptable and beneficial in corporate behaviors is 
inspired by business-relevant subsets of societal-level ideologies (Galvin, 
Ventresca & Hudson, 2004). Ultimately, the likelihood to greenwash, or in other 
words to design CSA to maximize legitimacy gains at the expense of societal 
benefits, is influenced by national contexts and shared cultural beliefs.  
Among them, cultural beliefs regarding the efficiency of economic systems 
are crucial. When the cursor moves between believing in the virtues of  ‘liberal’ or 
‘coordinated’ market economies, economic actors’ assumptions regarding the 
purpose of a firm – and thus its course of action – vary (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Matten & Moon, 2008). The ideology of liberalism makes the assumption that 
through competition firms will make optimal decisions to maximize the wealth of 
their shareholders (Hay, 2004), even when those actions include social actions. 
A coordinated-markets perspective would by contrast claim that in targeting 
wealth maximization for shareholders, firms may induce negative externalities on 
society, and that government should regulate the firms’ actions to limit those 
negative externalities (Hall & Soskice, 2001). As a consequence, country-level 
beliefs in the virtues of liberalism have been proven to influence the nature of 
corporate social behaviors (Hemingway & Malagan, 2004; Matten & Moon, 
2008).  
We aim at studying two foundational beliefs in the virtues of liberalism, 
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and their impact on corporate social behaviors. It appears first that liberal 
economic policies (e.g. deregulation, low-trade barriers, openness to 
globalization, etc.) are based on the idea that competition has positive societal 
consequences (Campbell, 2007). It appears secondly that liberal social policies 
(e.g. private social security or educational systems) rest on the belief that 
individuals should be responsible for themselves, rather than being cared for by a 
government (Matten & Moon, 2008). We propose that beliefs in favor of 
competition and individual responsibility might be seen as two founding beliefs in 
the virtues of liberalism (Hay, 2004; Whitman, 1999; Fligstein, 2001). In turn, the 
degree to which these beliefs permeate economic actors’ cultural environment 
affect how CSA is approached. 
Qualitative Exploration 
How are decision-makers in firms influenced by the dominant beliefs 
regarding the economic system? How does this translate into organizational 
decision-making when it comes to CSA? What are the most contentious points 
regarding economic liberalism and the role of business in society? In this first 
part of the study, we explore those questions qualitatively as a first step towards 
building our understanding of the relationship between beliefs in the virtues of 
liberalism and corporate decision-making. 
We use a focus group approach for this qualitative exploration, and 
completed this data collection with follow-up interviews with the participants. 
Focus groups were originally used to collect feedback on television programs but 
since then, they have been used in anthropology (Agar and MacDonald, 1995), in 
medical research (Kitzinger, 1995), and more recently in business ethics 
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(Vyakarnam, et al., 1997; Freestone and Mitchell, 2004). Focus groups rely on 
participants’ interaction around the topic under investigation to generate relevant 
data by observing the kinds of reactions and exchanges that emerge from this 
communication process (Morgan, 1988; Vyakarnam, et al. 1997). We build on a 
phenomenological approach as we focus on explicitly eliciting individuals’ 
experience and stories (Gill, Forthcoming). Participants are encouraged to reveal 
their perspective on a topic, which is particularly adapted for preliminary 
exploration of a research question (Morgan, 1988). Focus groups aim to get 
round participants’ reluctance to be interviewed when they feel they have nothing 
to say (Kitzinger, 1995) and steer clear of any contamination by the researcher 
(Vyakarnam, et al. 1997). Group dynamics ‘help people to explore and clarify 
their views in ways that would be less easily accessible in a one to one interview’ 
(Kitzinger, 1995: 299) and gives the researcher the opportunity to identify 
agreement or dissension around the topics of interest. The drawbacks with focus 
groups are that they can be dominated by stronger personalities (Jenkins and 
Harrison, 1990) leading to biases in the discussion, and that the focus group 
setting can be seen as ‘too artificial’ (Vyakarnam, et al. 1997: 1629). As a 
consequence we followed up with individual conversations with some of the 
participants to get a better sense of what they wanted to express. These 
interviews are particularly useful for the participants that were less involved in the 
focus group. 
We use a theoretical sampling model (Kitzinger, 1995). Our 9 chosen 
participants were selected to maximize diversity in terms of country of origin, as 
our main focus of interest is around country-level values. We are confident that 
our 9 participants comprise a sufficiently diverse panel, without being too large to 
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preclude sufficient interaction between them. The participants are established 
businesspersons based in 8 distinct countries and hold high-level responsibilities 
in medium-sized business from various industries (see Table 1 for a summary of 
their characteristics). The common criteria of our participants is that they have 
been involved in CSA for their firm or for major clients, including pro bono work 
for non-profit organizations, initiatives to reduce the environmental footprint, 
philanthropic engagement, fair trade business, or community support. The 
participants had not met each other prior to the focus group, but all were known 
to the mediator and researcher who invited them to participate in this study. 
Considering the difficulties of bringing together 9 participants from distant part of 
the world, the focus group and the follow up interviews were conducted through 
video conferencing. The focus group lasted for around 60 minutes, and the follow 
up interviews 20 to 35 minutes. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Although we were interested in the beliefs in the virtues of economic 
liberalism (i.e. what judgment is expressed regarding the value of economic 
liberalism), we wanted participants to express their own views on liberalism. As a 
consequence, the topic of the discussion was framed around liberalism and the 
role of business in society. The participants were unaware of this articulation and 
were progressively steered to debate this relationship. The design of our focus 
group was inspired by Vyakarnam et al. (1997), whereby the mediator is given 
the role of facilitator and ensures that all participants have the chance to express 
their view - this way, participants are free to formulate their own questions using 
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their own words, and forms of expression (anecdotes, jokes, arguments, etc.) 
(Kitzinger, 1995).  The session was introduced with questions regarding 
liberalism, then the mediator allowed the debate to unfold between the 
participants, progressively leading them to a discussion around the relationship 
between firms and liberalism, and the role of business in society. The coding of 
the data relied on common themes and patterns in the discussion. Arguments in 
favor of and against economic liberalism were distinguished and highlighted. In 
our analysis, we use the group dynamics to identify consensus opinion 
(consensus was almost never reached in the debate) and ‘deviant’ points of 
views, when individuals express a different perspective on the debated topic.  
Two themes are at the center of our analysis and each of them reflects 
one of the two perspectives of participants, who are at the same time business 
managers and citizens. These themes can be broadly captured by the two 
questions: How can economic liberalism be defined from a business 
perspective? And what is the role of business in a liberal society? “Freedom of 
enterprise” and a “limited role of the government” are clearly associated with 
economic liberalism by the majority of the participants. As stressed by one of 
them, these elements are connected to low fiscal pressure: a low level of taxes is 
associated with greater freedom for private firms. The impact of governments 
and institutions on business was a central concern. Some participants 
recognized that “hybrid systems” have emerged as the principles of economic 
liberalism are applied in “different scope and ways depending on local 
perception”. This way “political power can still have a say on economic 
concerns”. Participants also stress the importance of the “rule of law” and the fact 
that a liberal society is supposed to ensure “everybody [gets] a chance”, although 
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some participants attribute this responsibility to the state, or present it as a 
consequence rather than a necessary condition for a liberal society. 
A clear area of interest but also dissension between participants was 
whether economic liberalism is an “internally coherent system”. While some 
participants defend this view, others point out the failure of economic liberalism to 
fulfil the mission of offering opportunities to the widest number “by over-favoring 
those that are already at an advantage” while “some effects might contradict 
each other”. Participants discussed the example of monopolies: do they emerge 
as a consequence of economic liberalism, because the state is divorced from the 
economic system? If yes, some contributors explain that the system contradicts 
itself, as it is supposed ensure fair competition. Although liberty is perceived as 
the key foundational value of economic liberalism, it relies on the assumption that 
liberty can express itself and that the situation is fair for everybody. The role of 
the government must remain limited but it must still “ensure that everybody’s get 
the same chance”, which is stated as “paradoxical” by participants. 
How did participants view the role of business in society in relation to their 
perspective on economic liberalism? Participants were mainly in favor of a limited 
impact of government on business. On the other hand, the role of business in 
society was less clearly seen. When defining the role of the government in a 
liberal society, it was unclear for participants whether the state should or could 
ensure a principle of fair competition between social actors, which was perceived 
as essential to economic liberalism. For some participants “there is a clear cut” 
between the role of governments and the role of businesses, because liberalism 
relies on a delegation of power to the government. This implies that the role of 
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business in society is expected to be limited in a liberal society, as their primary 
focus is to “work for themselves”. This in line with previous research implying that 
entrepreneurs in developing economies are focused on short-term profitability 
and survival in contexts of strong competition, and weak governmental 
institutions (Touboul and Roulet, 2011; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). 
However, this view was nuanced by some participants, whose arguments unfold 
from the internal contradictions associated with economic liberalism. Because of 
weak governments (“no money, no legitimacy”), some businesses end up having 
more power than the state. One example is the case of multinationals being 
involved in the development of infrastructures, where firms end up substituting for 
governments. The paradox relies on the fact “the smaller the government, the 
more other people have to step in” as one participant pointed out. Is extreme 
liberalism to be confused with anarchy? One suggestion is to distinguish things 
for which firms are “really responsible” such as their own pollution, and, on the 
other hand, things they engage in which are not necessarily part of their duty. 
One participant used the example of Henry Ford doubling the wage of his 
employees so that they would be more likely to buy the Ford cars (the idea that 
“what you give, you get it back somehow”). CSAs are not necessarily as 
“genuine”, but rather can be used more cynically, for example as a “marketing 
tool”. 
Table 2 provides a collection of quotes to illustrate the main insights drawn 
from this qualitative exploration. Economic liberalism is mainly associated with a 
limited role of government, in conjunction with fair competition between social 
actors. However, there is an inherent contradiction in the limited role the 
government is expected to play in a liberal society and the fact that economic 
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liberalism is associated with fair competition. In other words, can government 
both be small and ensure that economic competition is equitable? For some 
participants, businesses can participate in rebalancing the system and substitute 
for the government when required. As suggested by Kinderman (2012), 
corporate social responsibility and liberalism are not necessarily antithetic.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Hypotheses Development 
Building on these first insights, we set out to determine how country-level 
beliefs in the virtues of liberalism might influence the likelihood of firms to 
greenwash. The findings of our qualitative exploration confirm that economic 
liberalism is associated both with limited government and fair competition. It also 
reveals the ambiguity surrounding the role of businesses in liberal societies: a 
limited government implies that other stakeholders need to step in to ensure the 
founding principles of liberalism are respected. 
We look first at the literature on the established link between actual 
economic systems and corporate actions. Some of this literature adopts what we 
might call a conventional view. As an example, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use 
Prechel and Morris’ (2010) argument that a liberal economic system leads firms 
to focus solely on profit-maximizing activities, and to ‘gain legitimacy as social 
actors by working with policymakers to create voluntary CSA frameworks’ that 
are created mostly in name only in developed countries (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012: 
79). In a context where firms are pressurized to focus on profitability, firms are 
more likely to frame their CSA to maximize financial gain (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 
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2013), and thus to greenwash. But some scholars adopt an alternative view on 
the relationship between economic liberalism and corporate behaviors. Jackson 
and Apostolakou (2010) make the opposite claim to the conventional view. They 
show that in liberal market economies, due to the absence of government 
protection, stakeholders are more likely to pressurize firms into social 
engagement. In turn, firms answer these pressures positively with substantive 
CSA, which in this context becomes a way to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors. Kinderman (2012) makes a similar argument by explaining that CSA 
substitutes for institutionalized social solidarity, and that corporate social 
responsibility and neoliberalism have co-evolved and complemented each other. 
In these contexts there is more reliance on voluntary action (Kang and Moon, 
2012). We call this alternative perspective the ‘pro-active’ view because it 
assumes the existence of a form of corporate voluntarism.  
Institutional perspectives oscillate between looking at CSA as ‘voluntary 
engagement’ or as ‘binding responsibility’ (Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012: 
3). These two perspectives would imply conflicting results when it comes to the 
likelihood to greenwash. They in fact only differ in the assumption they make 
regarding the behaviors of economic actors. The conventional view implies that 
firms behave selfishly. In more liberal contexts, they opt for symbolic CSA that 
aims at gaining the stakeholders’ support without bearing the cost of substantive 
actions, thereby greenwashing. On the other hand, the pro-active view assumes 
that firms are willing to step in to contribute to the coherence of the institutional 
system. Therefore when the government is not thought to be responsible for 
stakeholders’ welfare, firms consider that it is their responsibility to cope with 
their stakeholders’ social issues. Because beliefs in favor of competition and 
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individual responsibility are micro-foundations of economic liberalism, we develop 
hereafter two sets of hypotheses that follow these two perspectives (conventional 
and pro-active).  
The Conventional Perspective 
From the traditional perspective, what can we infer regarding the 
relationship between country-wide beliefs in liberalism and the implementation of 
symbolic rather than substantive CSA? Lim and Tsutsui (2012) found that in 
developed countries, the more liberal the economic system is, the more the 
adoption of CSA will be gestural. They argue that in liberal contexts in developed 
countries ‘major corporations in rich countries use voluntary corporate social 
responsibility frameworks to deflect criticisms and to circumvent stringent 
regulations’ (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012: 87). Julian and Ofori-Dankwa’s (2013) 
argument is in line with this perspective as they suggest that weakly 
institutionalized systems offer a lot more freedom to firms and make them less 
likely to invest in CSA. Our qualitative exploration suggests that liberalism is 
often associated with limited government and more reliance on individual 
responsibility. Participants stressed a clear separation of roles and 
responsibilities between business and government, which suggests that firms, 
including in their use of CSA, should focus on building up a competitive 
advantage. 
Campbell (2007) argues more specifically that businesses are less likely 
to engage in substantive CSA if there is too much competition. If competition is 
too high, firms will cut expenses that apparently fall outside direct profit 
maximization, and thus focus on impression management technique and favor 
symbolic over substantive CSA. This view implies that firms adopt opportunistic 
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approaches, and, based on this assumption, in a context in which people believe 
that competition is beneficial, firms would be expected to elbow their way 
through. Thus, beliefs in the virtue of competition are more likely to trigger the 
design of CSAs that build a competitive advantage, rather than to focus on social 
and environmental impact. Therefore when they are embedded in cultural beliefs 
in favor of competition, firms tend to greenwash, or in other words try to generate 
the benefits of stakeholders’ support with limited costs. Our first hypothesis is 
therefore: 
Hypothesis 1a: When cultural beliefs are in favor of competition, 
firms are more likely to greenwash. 
We next investigate the role of beliefs in favor of individual responsibility. 
Prechel and Morris (2010) have shown that in liberal contexts the presence of 
loopholes in institutional arrangements prompts individualistic actors to 
misbehave. This research suggests that individuals are inherently selfish. 
Consequently in context with strong beliefs in the virtues of individual 
responsibility, economic actors naturally act in their own interest at the expense 
of others. In this traditional view, substantive corporate social behaviors conflict 
with individual responsibility (Jo, 2012). Kim and Kim (2010) confirm this 
perspective and show on a sample of public relations practitioners that 
individualism is negatively related to substantive CSA. They argue that 
collectivism, as opposed to individualism, promotes societal values, as the utility 
of the group is ranked above individual interests. However, when the utility of the 
group is below personal interests, individuals tend to neglect societal values. As 
a consequence, we can hypothesize that a country-level belief in the virtues of 
individualism will have adverse behavioral consequences on firms’ commitment 
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to CSA, and thus will be more related to greenwashing. Our next hypothesis can 
be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1b: When cultural beliefs are in favor of individual 
responsibility, firms are more likely to greenwash. 
The Pro-Active View 
In opposition to the conventional view, some scholars have shown that 
companies in fierce liberal environments are also likely to engage in sincere CSA 
(Matten & Moon, 2008; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010) and even that liberalism 
co-evolved with the movement for corporate social responsibility (Kinderman, 
2012). This argument is less present in the literature. In liberal market 
economies, there is a lack of any kind of institutionalized interaction with 
stakeholders. In this situation, firms – because they are ‘pro-active’ - are less 
likely to use CSA as an impression management tool, as they fill the vacuum that 
weak government generates. Some elements of the focus group suggest an 
inherent contradiction between the idea of a small government and a system that 
ensures fair competition. This contradiction may imply a greater role for business 
to complement the role of the state in a liberal economy. 
In coordinated market economies, regulations are stricter and competition 
is limited. In such a situation, interactions with the environment are subjected to 
institutionalized constraints and regulations. There is less scope for voluntary 
CSA (Brammer, et al. 2012). However when competition is fierce, stakeholders 
exert a greater pressure on firms toward CSA, as no regulation is there to impose 
substantive actions on those firms. In this situation, engaging in CSA is a way for 
firms to differentiate themselves from their competitors. In this context, it implies 
that firms will be ‘pro-active’: they are less likely to greenwash as they will focus 
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on substantive CSA, which not only differentiates their firm but impacts the 
welfare of stakeholders. In a context of strong beliefs in the virtue of competition, 
acting substantially in favor of stakeholders is a way to remain competitive. 
Therefore in the presence of country-level cultural beliefs in the beneficial role of 
competition, stakeholders, by valuing the firms that differentiate themselves, 
have a tendency to pressure them toward substantive CSA, and thus, away from 
greenwashing. Our second set of hypotheses therefore begin thus: 
Hypothesis 2a: When cultural beliefs are in favor of competition, 
firms are less likely to greenwash. 
 Matten and Moon (2008) argue that in liberal market economies, because 
the role of individual responsibility is prominent, firms are more likely to engage in 
‘explicit’ CSA (i.e voluntary and concrete actions in favor of their stakeholders). 
Their argument is that when individual responsibility is favored instead of 
government responsibility, firms feel the pressure to tackle social issues since no 
government or institution will do it. In this view, Christie, Kwon, Stoeberl and 
Baumhart (2003) found that in an individualistic society such as the United 
States, people are more sensitive to unethical behaviors than in a society with a 
protecting government. As for the UK, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) note that 
the government’s disengagement from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s 
corresponded to a substantive increase in managers taking responsibility 
towards social and environmental issues. This evidence suggests that when a 
majority of the population supports a system in which responsibility is vested in 
individuals rather than in a government, substantive CSA increases. Firms fill the 
‘institutional void’ created by loose regulation by favoring a substantive impact on 
the welfare of their stakeholders, rather than tending towards greenwashing. 
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Consequently, our final hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2b: When cultural beliefs are in favor of individual 
responsibility, firms are less likely to greenwash. 
There are thus two perspectives on the impact of cultural beliefs in favor of 
competition and individual responsibility on the propensity of firms to greenwash. 
Our empirical analysis aims at validating, invalidating or confounding these two 
perspectives. 
Quantitative Testing 
Data and Method 
Data in this study was extracted from three different sources. To compute 
a measure of greenwashing, we first extracted evaluations of firms’ CSA from the 
Asset4 Database. Asset4 is a Swiss-based extra-financial rating agency 
subsidiary of Thomson Reuters, which provides several ratings related to firms’ 
CSA. Asset4 analysts compile their ratings by gathering raw data on firms’ CSA 
(e.g number of employees’ health and safety issues at work, definition of a 
strategy to reduce CO! emissions, signing of the United Nations Global Compact, 
etc.). They collect such information from all sources available in the public 
domain (Annual reports, social responsibility reports, Newspapers, NGO 
websites, etc.). These raw data are then transformed through a proprietary 
algorithm in several ratings and sub-ratings. Asset4 covers firms from 67 different 
countriesi belonging to major financial indexes worldwideii. By covering a set of 
958 firms in 2002 to 2920 firms in 2008, Asset4 was the world's largest database 
on firms’ extra-financial information in the frame of our study. Asset4 ratings on 
firms’ CSA are all the more relevant to our study as Asset4 analysts not only 
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examine firms’ degree of CSA, but also the detailed nature of these actions. 
More specifically, they differentiate firms’ substantive CSA (e.g. amount of CO! 
emissions reduced in the past year, number of injuries and fatalities at work), 
from their symbolic CSA (e.g. does the firm claim to have a policy for reducing 
environmental emissions? Does it claim to strive to improve its employee health 
& safety?). Asset4 claims that its ratings are able to measure firms’ ‘talk’ versus 
their ‘walk’ about CSA. Following Walker and Wan (2009), we combine these two 
measures by computing the ratio of symbolic to substantive action as a way of 
capturing the extent to which firms greenwash. 
We then completed our initial sample of firm-specific measures of the 
degree to which they engaged in greenwashing, with country-specific measures 
of cultural beliefs in the virtues of competition and individual responsibility. We 
are interested in the net effect of these two beliefs, everything else being equal, 
and how they are related to firms’ propensity to greenwash. These beliefs are 
related to each other (as they are both antecedents of economic liberalism) but 
not with other independent variables, considering they are at the firm level. The 
objective of this research is to disentangle the impact of these beliefs instead of 
establishing a conjunctional causation by looking at the effect of liberalism as a 
whole (with the conjunction of multiple antecedents). We ensure below that 
despite those measures being related, they are distinct enough so as not to 
contaminate our results, as we stress in the analysis section. We extracted such 
measures from the World Value Survey. The World Value Survey (WVS) is a 
public opinion survey, which has been conducted since 1981 on a regular basis 
(every 3 or 4 years depending on the country) by a worldwide network of social 
scientists. In 2008, the WVS covered a set of 83 countriesiii – including countries 
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whose data is less accessible. Data is collected through a rigorous process of 
interviewing – mostly face-to-face, except in remote areas - representative 
samples of national populations (on average 827 individuals are interviewed per 
wave and per country). Sociology scholars in particular have used the WVS to 
monitor and capture the evolution of values among populations (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000). Following Berry, Gullén and Zhou (2010), we use interpolation to 
obtain a measure of cultural beliefs for the 83 countries over the 2002-2008 
period, including for years between waves. For each year between 2002 and 
2008 and for each of the 83 countries, we obtained a measure of a population’s 
cultural beliefs in the virtues of competition and individual responsibility. We 
matched this country-specific data with our initial dataset of firm-specific 
measures considering the firm’s country of incorporation. In this sense we 
considered the most salient stakeholders for a firm to be those from its country of 
incorporation. Regarding the weight of the influence of the country of 
incorporation’s government on a firm’s operations, we formulate the reasonable 
assumption that this share is significant. This assumption also relies on a number 
of elements that confirm the primary influence of the country of incorporation. 
First, NGOs tend to target firms that they already know, and are thus 
incorporated in their own country. In addition, most firms are incorporated in the 
country where they were historically established, and thus where they make the 
highest share of their revenues.  
We finally completed our sample with firm-specific financial measures from 
Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database to compute our control variables. 
Our final sample is a panel that contains 10,232 observations from 2,621 
firms over 7 years (2002-2008). It is an unbalanced dataset due to limited 
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availability of some data related to firms’ CSA or countries’ cultural beliefs over 
the whole period. Our sample includes, on average, 1,462 observations per year 
and the 2,621 firms from 38 different countriesiv appear on average 3.9 years in 
our dataset. 
Dependent Variable 
Distinguishing symbolic from substantive CSA is a well-documented 
challenge (see Hawn & Ioannou, 2012). For each firm in its dataset, Asset4 first 
provides 18 ratings related to the firms’ degree of implementation of substantive 
CSA. Those 18 ratings reflect the different components of CSA (e.g. emission 
reductions, community impact, board structure, client loyalty) and are grouped in 
4 general categories (Economic, Environmental, Social and Governance 
responsibility)v.  More specifically, these 18 ratings measure the substantive CSA 
for each firm (implementation of care services for employees, amount of 
philanthropic donations, number of green facilities, etc.). To measure the firms’ 
Substantive CSA, we computed the average of those 18 ratings equally weighed 
per general category (Economic, Environmental, Social and Governance). We 
averaged the 18 ratings with equal weightings for each category so that 
categories with a higher number of ratings did not over-influence the final 
measure (as an example, the Social category contained 7 ratings while the 
Governance category contained 5 sub-ratings). This measure of Substantive 
CSA increases when firms implement a higher degree of CSA, and with the 
same magnitude whether actions were implemented in terms of Economic, 
Environmental, Social or Governance responsibility. Secondly, Asset4 also 
provides 18 ratings relating to the degree of implementation of symbolic CSA. 
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These 18 ratings cover the same 18 topics covered by substantive CSA ratings 
and are grouped in the same 4 general categories (Economic, Environmental, 
Social and Governance responsibility). Compared with substantive CSA ratings, 
symbolic CSA ratings measure symbolic CSA for each firm (e.g. does the firm 
claim to have a strategy to reduce its pollutant emissions? Does the firm claim to 
monitor its impact on local communities?). In the same way as we computed a 
measure of firms’ Substantive CSA, we compute a measure of firms’ Symbolic 
CSA by calculating the average of Asset4 18 symbolic CSA ratings equally 
weighted per general category.  
Our measure of greenwashing is aimed at capturing whether firms favor 
symbolic instead of substantive CSA: we therefore computed the ratio of our 
measure of firms’ Symbolic CSA to our measure of firms’ Substantive CSA. 
Thus, our greenwashing ratio measures the propensity to implement symbolic 
instead of substantive CSA.  
Independent Variables 
As we wanted to examine how populations’ cultural beliefs in favor of 
competition and individual responsibility would affect greenwashing, we 
concentrated on these two specific variables produced by the World Value 
Survey (WVS). We also concentrated solely on the answers from the 201,675 
interviews that were conducted in the 38 countries covered by both the WVS and 
Asset4 during the 2002-2008 period. 
The WVS first asks interviewees whether competition is good, and if it 
stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas, or whether it is harmful, 
and brings out the worst in people. For each of the interviewees, the strength of 
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their beliefs are coded on a scale from 1 to 10 – with 1 = ‘Competition is harmful’, 
and 10 = ‘Competition is good’ at opposite ends. As we were trying to compute a 
country-specific and not an individual measure of cultural beliefs in favor of 
competition, we computed the weighted average of interviewees’ beliefs in the 
benefits of competition per country. We thus obtained a measure of Cultural 
Beliefs in favor of Competition for each of our 38 countries. The individual 
weightings we deployed were provided by the WVS so that samples of 
individuals per country were statistically representative of their country’s 
population in terms of age, gender or socio-professional category. As a result, 
our measure of Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition is specific to each 
country, and increases when larger sections of this country’s population consider 
that ‘Competition is good’ rather than ‘Competition is harmful’. 
The WVS then asks interviewees whether people should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves, or if the government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Here we coded each of the 
201,675 respondents answers on a scale from 1 = ‘Government should take 
more responsibility’ to 10 = ‘People should take more responsibility’. We then 
computed the weighted average per country of respondents’ answers to obtain  
one measure per country of its population’s Cultural Beliefs in favor of Individual 
Responsibility. Consequently, this measure is high when a country’s population 
considers that “People should take more responsibility”, and low when people 
consider that “Government should take more responsibility”. To provide an 
overview of our independent variables we present in Figure 1 below the average 
country-level Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition and Cultural Beliefs in favor 
of Individual Responsibility for the 2002-2008 period. 
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-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
We can observe in Figure 1 that countries with higher Cultural Beliefs in 
favor of Individual Responsibility are developed market economies such as 
Switzerland, the United States, New Zealand or Canada. Whereas these 
countries also score high in terms of Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition, it 
appears that countries with higher scores on this variable are fast developing 
countries such as India, China or Morocco. 
Control Variables 
Taking as our dependent variable the propensity of firms to engage in 
greenwashing, we controlled our models for major factors that have been shown 
in literature to influence firms’ CSA and greenwashing such as firms’ Size, 
Profitability, Risk Exposure, Industry, Country of origin or the Year of the 
observation (Walker and Wan, 2009; Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). We operationalized firms’ Size by the logarithm of 
their revenues, Profitability by their return on assets (ROA), and Risk Exposure 
by the inverse of their solvency ratio. We controlled for unobserved Industry 
specific factors with a set of 24 dummies based on the first four digits of firms’ 
Thomson Reuters Business Classification code, and for Year, specific events 
with a set of seven year dummies. Most importantly, we controlled for any 
country-specific factor other than populations’ Cultural Beliefs in favor of 
Competition or Cultural Beliefs in favor of Individual Responsibility, such as 
governmental and other institutional pressures, populations’ receptivity, or foreign 
trade relations (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012), with a set of 38 country-specific dummies 
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based on country of incorporation. We also run our models separately for 
developing and developed countries (using Lim and Tsutsui’s (2012) dichotomy 
of OECD vs non-OECD countries), while including the previously mentioned 
country-fixed effects. 
Analysis 
Finally, we standardizedvi all our non-dummy variables to be able to 
compare their relative effect on firms’ propensity to favor substantive rather than 
symbolic CSA. In Table 3 below we provide summary statistics and list the 
Pearson correlations of our dependent and independent variables. Most 
correlations lie between -0.18 and 0.56, which suggests limited risks of 
multicollinearity issues. In addition, we computed the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) of our models, which ranges from 1.45 to 2.69 and thus suppresses any 
remaining doubt about the reliability of the finding. We find, naturally, that the two 
cultural beliefs in the virtues of liberalism are 56 % correlated, considering they 
are antecedents of liberalism at a more macro-level. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Our final models are random effects panel models with standardized 
variables, which were estimated with a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
method and heteroskedasticity-robust estimations of coefficients. We estimated 
random instead of fixed effects models. Fixed effects models didn’t allow us to 
fully control for unobserved country-specific effects on firms’ corporate behaviors, 
whereas the literature on the topic show those effects to highly impact the nature 
of firms’ CSA (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). We tested for the relevance of a random 
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effects model with a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, which validated our 
choice.  
Results 
Table 4 presents 6 models we used to test how country-specific Cultural 
Beliefs in favor of Competition and Cultural Beliefs in favor of Individual 
Responsibility impact firms’ propensity to greenwash. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Model 1 only includes the control variable and provides us with a base R! 
of 23.2%. Model 1 shows that bigger, less profitable and more risk-taking firms 
tend to greenwash. 
Model 2 includes country-level Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition as 
an independent variable and estimates a positive (0.21) and significant (at 1%) 
impact of Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition at the country-level on firms’ 
propensity to engage in greenwashing. In this sense, Model 2 validates 
Hypothesis 1a and supports an hypothesis built on the traditional view of 
liberalism and corporate behaviors: when there are country-level Cultural Beliefs 
in favor of Competition, firms tend to favor symbolic instead of substantive CSA. 
For instance, in a country with high Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition such 
as India, firms will be more likely to greenwash. 
Model 3 includes control variables and country-wide Cultural Beliefs in 
favor of Individual Responsibility. It shows that Cultural Beliefs in favor of 
Individual Responsibility significantly (0.1%) and negatively (-0.14) impact firms’ 
propensity to greenwash. Model 3 provides support for Hypothesis 2b and 
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validates a selective part of the pro-active view on the relationship between the 
beliefs in the virtues of liberalism and greenwashing. For example, in a country 
like Canada where the notion of individual responsibility is strong, firms tend to 
invest in the implementation rather than the signaling of CSAs. In other words, 
they are less likely to greenwash.  
Model 4 includes all of our independent variables. It highlights no 
significant changes in sign or value of the estimated coefficients for our Cultural 
Beliefs in favor of Competition and Cultural Beliefs in favor of Individual 
Responsibility variables. In this sense, Model 4 provides further support for 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2b. It also confirms that our estimates are not 
affected by multicollinearity. Model 4 confirms that firms will be more likely to 
greenwash when populations’ beliefs in individual responsibility are predominant, 
and when their beliefs in the virtue of competition are less prominent. Therefore, 
in a country like Morocco, where beliefs in the virtue of individual responsibility 
are low, but in the virtue of competition are high, firms are more likely to 
greenwash. Conversely, in a country like France, where the population believes 
in the virtue of individual responsibility but prefers an absence of competition, 
firms are less likely to greenwash as they tend to effectively implement CSA, 
without specifically signaling those actions.  
Models 1 to 6 include country-specific effects: in other words, we control 
for omitted variables that might be related to the country of origin, for example 
the level of development. To better understand the dynamics behind the impact 
of economic development, Models 5 and 6 split the samples by developed and 
developing countries, while also keeping country-level fixed effects in the model. 
Model 5 exhibits similar results to those obtained on the larger sample. We have 
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far fewer observations for developing countries (only 220 firms and 493 
observations) and thus, the results of Model 6 have to be taken with caution. 
When we limit our sample to developing countries, beliefs in favor of competition 
are negatively related to greenwashing. This suggests that firms in developing 
countries, when they do invest in CSA, will tend to focus in actual 
implementation. This is in line with Lim and Tsutsui’s (2012) findings, that ‘faced 
with pressures to signal commitment to CSR [corporate social responsibility], 
corporations in developing countries are more likely to make serious efforts’ (Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012: 88). This is also explicable by the fact that there are probably 
fewer legitimacy gains to be made in developing countries as suggested by 
Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2013) - stakeholders are less sensitized to social 
issues and/or have less impact on business, and thus CSAs are designed to 
maximize social or environmental impact rather than convey a positive image of 
the firm. 
It is interesting to note that as we initially standardized our variables, it is 
now possible to investigate the relative impact of each independent variable on 
the probability of firms’ greenwashing. Model 4 highlights that the positive impact 
of Cultural Beliefs in favor of Competition (0.37) is higher than the negative 
impact of Cultural Beliefs in favor of Individual Responsibility (-0.21). If we 
assume that believing in the virtues of liberalism means believing equally in the 
beneficial role of competition and in the prominence of individual responsibility, 
then this finding underlines that even if country-level beliefs in individualism push 
firms toward less greenwashing, in general, cultural beliefs in the virtues of 
liberalism favor firms’ greenwashing. Finally, it is also interesting to note that the 
impact of country-level Cultural Beliefs (0,37 and -0.21) is similar in magnitude to 
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firm-level variables such as firms’ Size or Profitability (-0.23 and 0.24). This 
finding shows that firms adjust their behaviors in terms of CSA not only 
depending on their own characteristics, but also depending on the normative 
context of the surrounding populations’ beliefs. 
Discussion  
Building on the existing literature, we initially assumed that beliefs in favor 
of competition and individual responsibility would affect corporate behaviors in 
the same way. Scholars considering that firms are naturally prone, as profit 
driven social actors, to selfish decision-making oppose those who think that they 
can also act pro-actively in a context where the interaction with stakeholders is 
weakly institutionalized. Our results show a more complex relationship between 
distinct beliefs in the virtues of liberalism and the nature of corporate social 
actions. We show that paradoxically, beliefs in favor of individual responsibility 
tend to push firms towards less greenwashing and with a true aspiration to do 
good, while beliefs in favor of competition lead managers toward egoistic 
greenwashing strategies based on a gestural commitment only.  
Although our study sheds light on several assumptions and mechanisms 
pertaining to the relationship between beliefs in the virtues of liberalism and the 
nature of CSA, we recognize that certain limitations exist. We focused, for 
example, on two beliefs which lie at the heart of the liberal creed - competition 
and individual responsibility – and in so-doing have no doubt omitted some other 
related convictions.  We made this decision for several reasons. First, the other 
founding values of liberalism are derived from the two beliefs we have focused 
on. As an example, confidence in free markets rather than in centralized and 
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organized exchanges (Hay, 2004) relies on the idea that individuals rather than 
governments should be responsible, and that they should be able to compete 
freely. Secondly, the World Value Survey from which we draw our measures of 
cultural beliefs in favor of competition and individual responsibility offered us a 
unique and powerful way to measure how central these values were in a broad 
variety of national contexts. Items used are unequivocal and enable us to 
compare cross-country attitudes in a consistent manner. This would not have 
necessarily been possible with a more complex set of beliefs. We nevertheless 
recognize that future research could take an interest in the impact on 
greenwashing of other liberal values than competition and individualism, such as 
the importance given to family, the social role of religion, tolerance, or 
compassion. 
As stressed by Kinderman (2012: 50), ‘neo-liberal sympathies do not rule 
out strong moral convictions and CSR engagement’. Firms, as social agents, 
may perceive other stakeholders as laborious, self-interested entities, but still feel 
the urge to engage in goodwill gestures to protect the individual rights of those 
stakeholders, the right to be autonomous and independent. These stakeholders 
might be the firm’s clients, business partners, and might play a crucial role in the 
future. In return, these managers expect stakeholders to act in a similar way. We 
therefore argue that substantive CSA is a way for firms to step in, protect and 
support weaker actors when there is nobody else to do so. Consequently, when 
firms are embedded in a culture of strong beliefs in the virtue of individual 
responsibility but with a feeble government, they are relied upon in the absence 
of stronger collective forces for the protection of stakeholders’ and individual 
rights. This finding also emerged in the focus group we organized. When 
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governments are weak (a factor implied by economic liberalism), businesses may 
have more power to ensure fair competition. This view is coherent with the 
results of the pro-active perspective on liberalism and greenwashing, revealing 
how pro-individualistic societies make social actors more sensitive to the 
treatment of others (Christie, et al. 2003). Our results show that firms with a 
competitive mindset might still engage in greenwashing to construct a 
competitive advantage. Respecting others does not mean that the quest for 
survival should be brushed aside altogether. When beliefs in the virtue of 
competition are prominent, firms tend to greenwash and use CSA as a strategic 
tool to manage their image. 
Ouu results show that beliefs in the beneficial role of competition is 
strongly related to firms’ greenwashing, and it more than compensates for the 
positive effect of beliefs in favor of individual responsibility. This finding suggests 
that even if firms are benevolent, social welfare cannot fully rely on their 
behavior, as predatory moves still prevail in liberal contexts.   
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Characteristics of the focus group participants  
 
 
Participant 
number 
Country Industry Type of CSA 
involvement 
Participant #1 China IT consulting Corporate 
volunteering 
Participant #2 Colombia Agribusiness Initiatives to reduce 
environmental 
footprint 
Participant #3 France Transport Community support 
Participant #4 Germany Communication Pro-bono missions 
Participant #5 United Arab 
Emirates 
Venture capitalism Philanthropic 
engagement 
Participant #6 United Kingdom Private equity Community support 
Participant #7 United States Cosmetics Fair–trade 
procurement and 
community support 
Participant #8 United States Strategy consulting Pro-bono missions 
Participant #9 Vietnam Serial entrepreneur Fair trade business 
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Table 2: Data exemplars on the three main topics of dissension 
 
 The definition of economic liberalism 
from a business perspective 
Implication of economic liberalism 
for business 
The role of business in an 
economically liberal society 
Simplified 
view (leading to 
the conventional 
perspective) 
“I would say limited role of government is the 
main thing you think about when you think 
liberalism.” (Participant #1) 
“The opportunity and the freedom of 
enterprise” (Participant #5) 
“A liberal society is necessarily more 
competitive, or is thought to be more 
competitive.” (Participant #7) 
“Economic liberalism is supposed to equal low 
fiscal pressure. Less money for the government 
to sponsor random things.” (Participant #5) 
“In a liberal society, governments are 
supposed to be hands off your business.” 
(Participant #5) 
“Efficient liberalism would hopefully work 
[monopolies] out.” (Participant #6) 
“Entrepreneurship is a creative destruction 
process. Your firm dies, then you create 
another one, and so on. It has also societal 
value, the society is more innovative.” 
(Participant #5) 
“A liberal society is necessarily more 
competitive, or is thought to be more 
competitive. Nobody is protected from 
competiton.” (Participant #7) 
“Survival of the fittest is one” (Participant 
#8) 
“I think there is a clear cut 
between the role of governments and 
the role of business. Citizens 
delegate the power to the state to 
build a fair society. It’s not the role of 
business to take over the role of 
government.” (Participant #6) 
“[As a firm] you are not supposed 
to go beyond just what you are 
responsible for.” (Participant #5) 
Elaborate 
view (leading to 
the pro-active 
stance) 
“I guess economic liberalism is thought to be 
a coherent set of ideas, frames and institutions” 
(Participant #1) 
“Giving a chance to everybody” (Participant 
#8) 
“Liberalism as it was said before is the idea of 
both equality and liberty.” (Participant #3) 
“The state as small as it can be, needs to 
ensure that the rule of law is respected.” 
(Participant #6) 
“I don’t think economic liberalism is separable 
from liberalism in general [...] everybody’s got a 
chance to be successful as a function of skills 
rather than luck, connections, starting assets 
coming from relatives, etc.” (Participant #7) 
“Economic liberalism is something relative.” 
(Participant #4)  
“With economic liberalism, the other side 
of the coin is that you are also on your own.” 
(Participant #5) 
“Not sure though that economic liberalism 
actually achieves the opposite: basically 
preventing everybody from having the same 
chance by over-favoring those that are 
already at their advantage.” (Participant #9) 
 
“It’s also the idea of what you 
give, you get it back somehow.” 
(Participant #6) 
“[Firms] make people think [being 
responsible] is genuine, or they do 
believe in it themselves.” (Participant 
#9) 
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Figure 1: Average country-level beliefs in favor of competition and 
individual responsibility, 2002-2008 
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Table 3: Pairwise correlation between dependent and independent variables 
 
 Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Greenwashing -3.53 5.66 1.00***     
2. Cultural Beliefs in 
Favor of Competition -3.06 3.45 -0.09*** 1.00***    
3. Cultural Beliefs in 
Favor of Individual 
Responsibility 
-2.65 2.18 -0.15*** 0.56*** 1.00***   
4. Size -7.35 2.73 -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.13*** 1.00***  
5. Profitability -8.80 7.56 0.19*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.15*** 1.00*** 
6. Risk -2.46 5.83 -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.35*** -0.18*** 
All variables being standardized, their mean equal 0 and their standard deviation equals 1 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 4: Random effects regressions of beliefs in favor of competition and individual 
responsibility on firms’ propensity to greenwash 
 
 
 Greenwashing: Symbolic vs. Substantive Corporate Social Action 
Ratio 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) 
Developed 
countries 
(6) 
Developing 
countries 
Cultural Beliefs in 
Favor of 
Competition  
 0.21**  0.37*** 0.43*** -0.52*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cultural Beliefs in 
Favor of Individual 
Responsibility 
  -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.34 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) 
Size 
0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** -0.14 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) 
Profitability 
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.18*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk 
0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.13 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) 
Constant 
-0.42*** -0.24** -0.30*** 0.06 0.11 -0.50 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.56) (0.25) (0.60) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,232 10,232 10,232 10,232 9,739 493 
Number of firms 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,401 220 
R! Within 0.139 0.141 0.143 0.149 0.154 0.144 
R! Between 0.286 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.295 0.384 
R! Overall 0.232 0.233 0.234 0.237 0.242 0.352 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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